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Foreign investment in US companies and assets has long been controversial, with the recent uproar over the 
Dubai Ports World acquisition being only the latest example. During World War I, national security concerns 
arose in the United States over foreign investment, particularly from Germany. Encouraged by the US Navy, 
Congress moved to adopt restrictions on foreign investments in shipping, air services, and broadcasting sectors 
and passed the Trading with the Enemy Act, which was used to seize German- and British-owned assets. Con-
troversy developed again in the 1980s with respect to investments from Japan. In response, Congress in 1988 
passed the Exon-Florio Amendment, which gave the president broad powers to block a foreign acquisition of a 
US company if that transaction threatened to impair US national security. 
Concern has surged over recent investment from China, beginning with the takeover of the personal com-
puter operations of IBM by Chinese firm Lenovo. The debate intensified in 2005 with the (subsequently with-
drawn) bid by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation to buy US oil firm Unocal. The furor in Congress 
intensified in early 2006, when Dubai Ports World bought the port operations of the UK-based Peninsular 
and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, which would have given Dubai Ports World control of operations at 
six US ports. Although this transaction easily passed a review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS), many members of Congress deemed the transaction unacceptable. Consequently, Dubai 
Ports World agreed to sell its interest in the six US ports. 
A number of bills (at last count about 20) have since been introduced in Congress that would modify 
Exon-Florio, the CFIUS process, or broader foreign investment laws. Several of these bills can only hurt the 
United States and therefore must be rejected. The CFIUS process can be improved, but changes should be 
narrowly tailored to ensure that foreign investment in the United States is not chilled. Among the changes that 
should be pursued are: 
adding protection of critical infrastructure as a factor for CFIUS consideration. CFIUS, and particularly 
the Department of Homeland Security, should clarify exactly how it would protect “critical infrastructure.” 
Currently, the link between foreign ownership of such infrastructure and national security is unclear.
establishing security standards for employment of nonnationals in sensitive positions. US security 
agencies can have foreign nationals employed in sensitive positions screened by their own governments or by 
independent screening agencies operating under the laws of a particular individual’s home country. Doing so 
would require CFIUS to recognize the validity, through mutual recognition agreements, of background checks 
undertaken by friendly foreign governments. 
•
•
In Briefenhancing disclosure of information to Congress. CFIUS should enhance the quality and quantity of in-
formation provided to Congress on the operation of Exon-Florio. Greater information disclosure should be 
limited to aggregate rather than detailed, transaction-specific data. Congress should not demand, nor should 
CFIUS provide, confidential business data that parties to a particular transaction give to CFIUS.  
clarifying the standard by which CFIUS determines whether there is “foreign control.” CFIUS agencies 
should clarify the critical elements of the control test and consider raising the 10 percent threshold of owner-
ship, above which control is presumed.
developing international standards for national security review processes. Members of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, joined by China, India, and Russia, should develop principles 
that govern laws for national security–related screening processes for foreign investment.
A number of other ideas will chill investment without enhancing national security. So Congress and the 
executive branch should reject them:
mandatory filings of all foreign acquisitions. This requirement would completely overwhelm the CFIUS 
process, force CFIUS to focus on transactions that do not raise national security issues, and divert attention 
from cases that do.
moving the CFIUS chair. No other US government agency is better equipped to chair the process than 
the Treasury Department is. At the same time, Treasury should defer to security agencies with expertise on 
particular transactions and should strengthen its own security expertise. 
introducing an economic security test. Exon-Florio is perhaps most frequently criticized for not allowing 
CFIUS and the president to consider economic as opposed to national security issues. Adopting an economic 
security test would undermine the United States’ long-standing policy of welcoming foreign investment, be 
extremely difficult to implement, and further politicize the CFIUS process.
The growing discomfort on Capitol Hill over the rise of China as a foreign investor and congressional reac-
tion to the Dubai Ports World deal have cast doubt on the United States’ interest in encouraging foreign investment. 
Without continued and growing inflows of foreign investment, US manufacturing, employment, competitiveness, 
and innovation will be at risk.  It will become harder to attract the massive amounts of foreign capital needed to 
finance the large and growing US current account deficits. Unless the United States remains open to foreign invest-
ment, it will alienate its allies and could find itself isolated in an increasingly interdependent world. Maintaining an 
open environment for foreign investment is in itself deeply in the national security interest of the United States.
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